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Public involvement in traditional political institutions has declined significantly over the past few decades, leading to what some have seen as a crisis in citizenship (Putnam 2000; Macedo et al. 2005; Stoker 2006). In Europe, we have witnessed a large decline in voter turnout (Franklin et al. 2004; Fieldhouse et al. 2007) and a dramatic fall in the membership of political parties (Van Biezen et al. 2012). These trends are most striking amongst young people, who have become alienated from mainstream electoral politics (Sloam 2012 and 2013a). In austerity Europe, young people have furthermore been forced to bear the brunt of the global financial crisis and sovereign debt crises: from worsening levels of child poverty, to spiralling youth unemployment, to cuts in youth services and education budgets, to increased university tuition fees. Young Europeans’ lives have become more precarious and their futures increasingly bleak in the current climate of low growth and falling public spending (OECD 2013). This has led to a second and more dramatic loss of confidence in politicians and political parties to add to the slow-burning participatory crisis in electoral politics. 

Nevertheless, there is overwhelming evidence to show that young people are not apathetic about ‘politics’ – they have their own views and engage in democracy in a wide variety of ways relevant to their everyday lives (Norris 2003; Marsh et al. 2007; Spannring et al. 2008; Dalton 2009).​[1]​ Thus, the rise and proliferation of protest politics amongst young Europeans in the aftermath of the global financial crisis is hardly surprising (Sloam 2013a). In Europe, the political mobilisation of the ‘outraged’ young (Hessel 2010) has taken many different forms: from mass demonstrations of the ‘indignados’ against political corruption and youth unemployment in Spain, to the Occupy movement against the excesses of global capitalism, to the growth in support for new political parties (such as the German Pirate Party and the Italian Five-Star Movement) that rail against the elitism of established political parties. Young people’s politics has diffused through multiple networks, across borders and continents – from North Africa to Europe to the United States and back again – to demand political change (Bennett 2012; Castells 2012). This article focuses on the diversity of youth participation during this current ‘cycle of protest’ (Tarrow 1998), exploring how young people’s politics manifests itself through diverse repertoires of participation across multiple arenas of political action and different civic-political cultures. 

In particular, the article examines the role that the Internet and new media have played in the political mobilisation of young Europeans. Why have we seen such an explosion of participation through the Internet and the social media in recent years? Bennett and Segerberg (2012: 739, 748) write of the emergence of a new ‘logic of connective action... based on personalized content sharing across media networks’, whereby ‘formal organizations are losing their grip on individuals, and group ties are being replaced by large-scale fluid social networks’. These networks form the basis of alternative modes of political participation that match younger citizens’ preferences for non-institutionalised, horizontal engagement. For example, it is much more attractive to sign an online petition, forwarded by a friend, on online ‘snooping’, than to actively support the broad programme of a top-down organisation like a political party.

The point here is that recent crises – of disillusionment with politicians, of anger at corporate greed, of discontent with government cuts in public services and benefits, of frustration with youth unemployment – have created the ideal conditions for connective action amongst an ideal target group: young, highly-educated, technologically-savvy citizens. With these ideal conditions for connective action, we have witnessed a quickening of political participation, whereby the new media enables a dramatic speeding up of political mobilisation by: a) acting as a real-time filter for alternative politics, where only the most resonant ideas rise to the surface e.g. ‘the outraged young’, ‘we are the 99%!’; and, b) radically reducing communication costs (Bimber et al. 2005) for participation in new political movements. These new movements often take on hybrid forms with both an online and an offline presence (Castells 2012; Chadwick 2013). This article emphasises the importance this hybridity (of media systems and arenas of engagement). 

Although one can make some general claims about the current wave of youth protest, it is important to put these rich but diverse forms of political engagement into context. The article draws upon four case studies: two largely informal and non-institutionalised movements – the Spanish ‘indignados’ (outraged young) or 15 March Movement (M15M), and the Portuguese ‘Geração à Rasca’ (desperate generation) or 12 March Movement (M12M); and, two nascent political parties – Beppe Grillo’s Five-Star Movement (5SM) in Italy, and the German Pirate Party (Piratenpartei). These case studies have interesting similarities but important differences with regard to the depth of the economic and political crises they were responding to (in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Germany), how the movements came into being, and the nature of their political mobilisation (from demonstrations and occupations to political representation). Three common features of the M15M, the M12M, the 5SM and the Piratenpartei are their prominent use of the Internet and new media, their attractiveness to highly-educated young people, and their issue-based (rather than programmatic) appeal.  


Channelling Diversity: emerging repertoires and arenas of political participation

The lives of young Europeans have changed quite considerably over recent decades. Younger citizens are increasingly faced by a ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992) in which they must negotiate their own way and construct their own identities (social, economic and political) within a network society (Castells 2010). The transition from youth to adulthood has become more staggered (Arnett 2004; Furlong and Cartmel 2007): Europeans on average stay in education longer, leave home, marry and have children later, and take longer to acquire ‘permanent’ (if often precarious) employment (European Commission 2009). The concept of ‘risk’ is best illustrated by the uncertainty of a changing labour market – even in good times, there is nowadays little of prospect of a job for a life.  

These changes have led to the individualisation of young people’s lives – the breakdown of traditional social mores and the increasing fluidity of identities defined by social networks. The individualisation of modern society has, in turn, led to the individualisation of politics (Giddens 1991; Bennett 1998) – the growing prominence of ‘lifestyle politics’, ‘identity politics’ and (in terms of political participation) personal action frameworks. These changes have important consequences for political participation. Today’s young Europeans can be characterised as ‘stand-by citizens’ (Amnå and Ekman 2013), who have a preference for intermittent, non-institutionalised, horizontal forms of engagement in issues that have relevance to their everyday lives (Bang 2003; Marsh et al. 2007).  

Voting is still the most common mode of engagement in established European democracies, but youth turnout has declined significantly in recent years (Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Sloam 2013a) as repertoires of participation have become more diverse. The existing literature on participation has highlighted increasing public involvement in petitions, boycotts and demonstrations since the 1970s (Norris 2002; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). However, detailed analysis shows that these forms of engagement are just one part of a broader spectrum of participation. Van Deth et al. (2007) in their study of ‘citizenship and involvement in Europe’ employ a much more comprehensive battery of political activities (see also Pattie et al. 2004), and find that two less commonly surveyed modes of engagement, ‘donating money’ and ‘buying certain products’ (‘buycotts’), were the second and fourth most common types of participation (Teorell et al. 2007). With declining youth participation in electoral politics and increasing engagement in alternative forms of participation, young people’s repertoires of political action have become more heterogeneous than is the case for older generations (Sloam 2013a). 

As repertoires of participation have become more diverse, so have the arenas in which they take place.  With the growth and proliferation of non-electoral forms politics, citizens have sought to make their voices heard across many different platforms (beyond formal politics). In this context, non-governmental organisations have become more important channels of participation (Norris 2002), but so too have more individualised forms of political action such as consumer politics (Stolle et al. 2005). In reality, individualised forms of political engagement and organised political action can operate in tandem (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). Indeed, a defining feature of the current wave of youth protest has been the use of hybrid public spaces (Castells 2012). On the one hand, these movements have focused on the occupation of physical locations of key symbolic value – from Egypt’s Tahrir Square to Madrid’s Puerta del Sol to Zuccotti Park in Manhattan to Gezi Park in Istanbul. On the other hand, the Internet and the new social media have provided an invaluable tool for connecting and mobilising young people to become active in these movements (Kaldor and Selchow 2013). 

In this regard, new technologies have become wedded to (and often transformed) existing forms of participation across the broad spectrum of political participation (Banaji et al. 2009; Pew Research Center 2013). The explosion of online petitions is a good example of where the Internet has enhanced opportunities for political engagement (Earl and Schussman 2008). Banaji and her colleagues (2009), in their study of political websites in Europe, highlight the importance of ‘civic sharing’ in online youth participation. Civic sharing is central to the recent quickening of youth participation, enabling the dramatic sifting through of ideas in real-time, whereby the most resonant ideas rapidly rise to the surface. Once again, this process is facilitated by the low cost of online communication. 

The following analysis of the four case studies highlights the quickening of political participation in a time of crisis. Young, highly educated ‘stand-by citizens’ (Amnå and Ekman 2013), have become activated by these crises (of youth unemployment, of frustration with politics and public policy, of anger with corporate greed) into ‘digitally networked action’ utilising new technology platforms (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). The following sections look at how participation takes place in a time crisis – how young people are mobilised and how this manifests itself in political action – across the case studies. 

 
Taking the Square: the ‘Outraged’ and ‘Desperate’ Generation

The protests of the ‘outraged’ and ‘desperate’ generation that flourished so vividly in the central squares of Madrid and Lisbon in 2011, were the clear expression of frustration and anger with a political and economic class that had led Spain and Portugal to the brink of political and economic collapse. By 2011, it was also obvious that the younger generations would have to bear the brunt of these crises. According to Eurostat (2013) figures, in the four years from 2007 to 2011 youth unemployment (the proportion of young people looking for a job that are unemployed), jumped from 18.2% to 46.4% in Spain and 20.4% to 30.1% in Portugal. The youth unemployment ratio (the proportion of all young people whom are unemployed) rose from 8.7% to 19% in Spain and 6.9% to 11.7% in Portugal during the same period. Economic crisis was accompanied by political crisis, with the emergence of governments that were fixated on the reduction of public spending. In 2011, the socialist administrations of Spain (Prime Minister Zapatero) and Portugal (Prime Minister Socrates) both fell after trying to implement swingeing austerity measures, but were replaced by governments (under Rajoy in Spain and Coehlo in Portugal) that only deepened planned cuts in public spending.​[2]​ Thus, there appeared to be no political alternative to this economic course. In both countries austerity had a particularly large impact on youth – from falling education budgets, to reduced unemployment benefits, to the closure of many youth leisure facilities. So, in a very immediate sense, the relevance of politics for the everyday lives of young Spaniards and young Portuguese was impossible to ignore (Taibo 2013). 

Although the protests of young people in Spain and Portugal sprang from similar political and economic crises, the countries have quite different participatory cultures and traditions of protest. Pooled European Social Survey from 2002-2008 shows that, in comparison to other countries in Western Europe, Spain has a healthy participatory culture (Sloam 2013b). Furthermore, Spaniards participated in demonstrations at higher rates than any other ‘old EU15’ state (before the financial crisis, 27% of young Spaniards had taken part in a demonstration in the previous year). Of particular note, were the protests against Spanish involvement in Iraq.​[3]​ By contrast, youth participation in Portugal is relatively low across eight political activities (including voting and protest activities) – lowest of all the EU15 countries and about half the rate of youth participation in Spain (Fernandes 2012; Sloam 2013b).​[4]​ Nevertheless, in both countries the youth protests that emerged in 2011 were united in their rejection of existing civil society groups (Taibo 2013). In Portugal, it could be argued that the digitally networked action of young people filled a void in a country with weak levels of participation in traditional political institutions (Baumgarten 2013). In Spain, however, the protestors made the deliberate choice to work outside the trade unions (and other established groups with whom they shared a similar cause), to horizontally network their own participatory activities rather than fall under the control of existing institutions. Operating outside of these formal networks, the omnipresent crises led to the rise of two significant movements that enjoyed the support of activists and of the general populations in these two countries. 

The political and economic crisis felt by the largely young and well-educated (and mostly female) Spanish and Portuguese protestors (Anduiza et al. 2013), sprung to life in real-time through social networks in response to the political and economic crises that touched their everyday lives (Estanque et al. 2013). In this sense, the new social media acted as a catalyst for the quickening (acceleration and intensification) of political participation. The political objectives of the two movements shared many common features – the desire for: more transparent forms of politics and greater use of direct democracy; an end to austerity and an investment in measures to boost youth employment; government regulation of ‘corporate greed’; and, the implementation of measures to address socio-economic inequalities (DRY 2013; Estanque et al. 2013; Geração à Rasca 2013; Taibo 2013). 

Both M12M and M15M made use of hybrid media systems and public spaces. The movements were founded online, and new technologies provided main arena for the sharing of information and the mobilisation (through social networks) of participants (Anduiza et al. 2013). However, the occupation of real-world spaces – through demonstrations and protest camps – became the key participatory focus of the movements. Here, the relationship between these hybrid systems and forums and the sequencing of these participatory acts, is of great interest. In these instances, the logic of connective action privileged the online start-up and mobilisation of the protests, with a real-world participatory focus that – in turn – was sustained through the new social media.

In Spain, the protests of 15 May 2011 can be traced back to a call from the digital platform Real Democracy Now! (‘Democracia Real Ya!’) for political action. In its manifesto, this group drew upon a common sense of grievance to invoke political action: 
‘Some of us have clearly defined ideologies, others are apolitical, but we are all concerned and angry about the political, economic and social outlook which we see around us: corruption among politicians, businessmen, bankers leaving us helpless, without a voice.... For all of the above, I am outraged.’ (DRY 2013)
In January 2011, Real Democracy Now! asked social networks and forums to unite and take to the streets, and thus acted as a central node in the protest network.​[5]​ 20,000-50,000 mostly young people took to the streets in Madrid on 15 May (alongside demonstrations in many other Spanish cities), marching to the central squares to declare and highlight their grievances. The heavy-handed police response to these mostly peaceful protests escalated the situation, leading to the outbreak of violence. After the demonstrations, hundreds of protestors headed to the Puerta del Sol. Their subsequent eviction by the police, led to the call – via Twitter, Facebook and SMS (moving beyond the DRY platform) – for the mass occupation of the main squares of Spanish cities until 22 May, the date of upcoming national elections. Thus, the elections also provided an important focus. The occupation of the square by thousands of young Spaniards in Madrid in particular, was supported by the on-the-ground organisation of food and sanitation as well as the use of live webcams (through the website Upstream.tv) to publicise the cause. Although the occupation gradually dispersed over several months, Puerta del Sol remained at the heart of the indignados movement. And, the M15M channelled its energies into a series of further actions, including a mass march to Madrid in June 2011 and a demonstration of over half a million people in support of the 15 October 2011 global day of protest.

In Portugal, the 2011 protests of the so-called desperate generation can be traced back to the performance of a song, ‘How silly am I?’, by the group Deolinda, that directly addressed the frustrations of young (educated) Portuguese. The singer sung of her experiences:
‘I’m lucky just to be an intern... what a stupid world, where to be a slave you have to study... I’m from the generation living with their parents... I’m from the generation “can’t take it any more”, the situation has been going on far too long, and I’m not stupid’ (Deollinda 2013)
Immediately the song struck a chord with young people across Portugal, and became a big hit on YouTube. It inspired four young friends to set up Facebook event calling for a peaceful demonstration to highlight the issues of youth unemployment and precarious job contracts, for a generation that felt it had no voice (Geração à Rasca 2013). This call to arms, networked through various online media, led directly to the demonstrations that took place on 12 March 2011, of hundreds and thousands of (mostly young) citizens in Lisbon, Porto and several smaller cities. As in Spain, these protests became intertwined with the political fate of the governing parties. Socrates resigned as Prime Minister, after failing to achieve parliamentary support for further austerity measures, less than two weeks after the demonstrations. The 12 March protest marked the foundation of a broader M12M movement (formed in April 2011) that became involved in a series of activities – linked to the Spanish indignados and the global Occupy Movement – such as the occupation for Rossio Square in Lisbon (May 2011) and participation in the 15 October day of global protest.

The logic of connective action appears to have been particularly important in Portugal in filling the relative vacuum in political engagement (Baumgarten 2013). However, in both Spain and Portugal, the M15M and the M12M made a deliberate point of not working with or through established political institutions such as the trade unions, which might otherwise have been seen as natural political allies. Another noticeable feature of the two movements was the almost seamless interaction between the real and virtual worlds (Anduiza et al. 2013). Online start-ups fed real word engagement, which – in turn – fed further networking through the social media e.g. the creation of the ‘Forum of the Generations’ in Portugal. However, the indignados movement in Spain has been better able to maintain its momentum – perhaps thanks to a healthy indigenous participatory culture. Real Democracy Now! still (in October 2013) maintains a strong following with over half a million Facebook likes and more than quarter of a million Twitter followers. This dwarfs the online audience of any of the M12M platforms in Portugal.

Another important aspect of the M12M and the M15M was the international dimension of the protest movements. This was clear for all to see. The Spanish indignados were directly influenced by the initial Portuguese demonstrations, as well as by other recent movements. In reference to the ‘Arab Spring’, the Egyptian flag could be seen flying in Madrid. And, in turn, the occupation of Puerta del Sol was mimicked by the M12M occupation of Rossio Square – indeed, some of the Portuguese protestors referred to themselves as the Lisbon indignados (Baumgarten 2013). In both countries, young people were reenergised by the Occupy Movement that spread from the United States across Europe, leading to their mass participation in the 15 October 2011 day of action. The Spanish M15M have played a proactive role in this internationalisation process – the 15 October global day of protest was first called for by Real Democracy Now! and the M15M  sought to maintain the international moment through the creation of the international TaketheSquare.net platform (which aims to connect with similar youth protest movements in Europe, the United States, Brazil, Turkey, and so on).


Marching through the institutions: from populism to piracy

The clamour for young people to vent their frustration with political and economic elites not only found its expression through the socially networked demonstrations, occupations and rallies of the outraged young across Europe (and beyond). The emerging political voice of young Europeans was also felt more directly in the political system through the decline in support for mainstream political parties and the rise in support for smaller parties. One consequence has been a growth in political extremism – from the anti-immigrant National Front in France, to the neo-fascist Golden Dawn in Greece. Young men from less privileged backgrounds have been particularly attracted to these far-right groups. Another consequence has been the rise of new anti-system parties that offer to do politics in a different way. In this sense, the Italian Five-Star Movement and the German Pirate Party emerged from the same fertile ground, drawing much of their support from highly-educated young people (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; Bartlett et al. 2013; Niedermayer 2013). These two parties are particularly interesting for the purposes of this article, because of their use new technologies and apparent commitment to horizontal, networked forms of democratic participation.

However, the levels of political and economic crisis in Germany and Italy are at opposite ends of spectrum in the European context. In Italy, young people have for decades been excluded by a closed political elite – a system saturated with corruption and nepotism – whereby the dominant political figure over the past  two decades, former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, has regularly become embroiled in court-room battles and out-of-court controversies. Berlusconi’s vast media empire is symbolic not only of highly concentrated press ownership, but also of the cosy relationship between political and economic elites. Germany has witnessed some long-term disillusionment with electoral politics (‘Politikverdrossenheit’) – more specifically, the vote for the two largest parties, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, has fallen significantly since re-unification in 1990. This has resulted in a significant growth in support for the three smaller parties – the liberal Free Democrats, the socialist Left Party, and the Greens. However, any disillusionment with politics amongst the younger generation seems to have been mollified by the diversity of choice within the political system (Pokorny 2012). Thus, youth support for democracy and trust in the political system remains strong (Albert et al. 2010).

Youth participation in Germany is supported by a vibrant participatory culture, which can boast above average (in the EU15) levels of participation in electoral and non-electoral forms of politics (Sloam 2013b). Political protest is a common feature of German political life. A number of mass demonstrations have taken place in recent years, including protests against nuclear power (in the wake of the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster), which led to a reversal of government policy on the closure of Germany’s nuclear power stations. Although youth participation in Italy is about average in the EU15, this figure is skewed by high voter turnout amongst young people (Sloam 2013b), which may have something to do with the penalties associated with non-voting (i.e. the restriction of entry to public sector jobs). In fact, general disillusionment with the Italian political, business and media elites (discredited by numerous financial and political scandals) is very common.

In Italy, the perilous state of the economy and state indebtedness (approximately 120% of GDP in 2011) forced the Berlusconi Government into a Euros 70bn package of savings measures. In November 2011, after pressure from the markets, Berlusconi was forced to resign. He was replaced by the technocratic administration of former EU Commissioner Mario Monti, who was charged with restoring the countries debt to sustainable levels. Even before the financial crisis, Italy was dogged by persistently high levels of youth unemployment and low social mobility. The post-2008 sovereign debt crisis made a bad situation worse.​[6]​ According to Eurostat (2013) figures, youth unemployment rose from 20.3% in 2007 to 29.1% in 2011, while the youth unemployment ratio rose from 6.3% to 8.1% during the same period. In Germany, by contrast, the economy bounced back quickly after 2008-9 to deliver export-led growth in 2010.​[7]​ Thus, Germany was the only EU country that managed to significantly decrease youth unemployment between 2007 and 2011, from 11.9% to 9.9% (Eurostat 2013). The youth employment ratio also fell, from 6.1% to 4.5%, during this period (Ibid.). 

The Five Star Movement and the German Pirate Party were not founded as a direct consequence of the global financial crisis (even if the crisis was particularly useful in accelerating the emergence of the 5SM). In a sense both parties were borne of the slow-burning crisis in electoral politics – the long-term decline in electoral turnout and support (and membership) for mainstream political parties. Both were able to reach out to young, highly-educated (mostly male) technologically savvy citizens (Bartlett et al. 2013), who felt alienated or repelled by mainstream parties and politicians – through the new media and social networks. And, in both cases, the parties have also been able to attract many non-voters (Bartlett et al. 2013; Niedermayer 2013). 

The central aims of the two parties are similar in a number of key features. The aims of the 5SM, articulated in Grillo’s blogs and online in his so-called ‘non-statute’ (5SM) centred on the overturning of the political and media establishment – ‘the two casts’ (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013). But as the movement expanded it began to embrace a wider range of issues (articulated by Grillo) from better internet connections, to greater government transparency, to universal healthcare and environmental protection. The raison d’etre of the German Pirate Party is clearly established within the realms of new technologies. Niedermayer (2013) emphasises how the party has tried to portray itself as the defender of citizens’ rights in the digital age. The Piratenpartei advocates a free internet (free from government restrictions, and cost-free downloads), transparent politics, direct democracy, and (more recently) a minimum wage (Neumann and Fritz 2012). 

The Five-Star Movement (founded in 2009) is centred on the person and personality of Beppe Grillo, a well-known comedian whose stand-up routine highlighted and mocked the corruption and cronyism within the political and business worlds. For Grillo, the use of the new media became central to his organisation to circumnavigate the Berlusconi-dominated old media, which he viewed with as much distrust as politicians themselves. As the leader of a major political party, he is distinct in not giving interviews to any of the Italian print and broadcast media. In 2005, Grillo set up a blog, www.beppegrillo.it, to act as a mouthpiece to discuss political and social problems. This blog soon became one of the most popular sites in Italy and played a central role in the growth of Grillo’s movement, acting as ‘a shop window to recruit interested passers-by’ (McDonnell 2013). However, the key to the success of the 5SM has also been the interaction between the online and the offline (Ibid.). Grillo called on followers to meet-up to discuss the issues raised in his blog and act on them in their local communities. Working through meetup.com, these groups were a great success, and by the time of writing (October 2013) had expanded to a network of over 150,000 activists – covering almost all major Italian towns and cities.​[8]​ These meet-up groups, in turn, helped to sustain the growth of the movement online. By 2013, Grillo could boast over a million Twitter followers and Facebook likes. These activities were also supported by the organisation of ‘V-Days’ (literally ‘fuck-off days’) – ‘a message directed in particular towards Italy’s political class’ (Bartlett et al. 2013: 21). The first V-Day in 2007 took place across hundreds of squares in Italian towns and cities. In these public events, Grillo demonstrated his undeniable talent for tapping into citizens’ sense of everyday politics:
‘It is up to us to do politics every day, a little bit more each time... when we do the shopping, when we travel by bus... when we go to school’ (Grillo, V-Day 2007, cited in Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013: 8)

The scale of Italy’s political economic crisis after 2008 proved to be the main catalyst in the foundation (in 2009) and growth of the 5SM, lending Grillo’s political message added weight. And, this was soon translated into electoral success through the mobilisation of ‘friends of Beppe Grillo’ groupings in local, regional and national elections. Grillo has tried to remain aloof from the political fray, and refused to run for elected office himself. Nevertheless, he has remained key to the success of the 5SM, supporting electoral campaigns through public events and the use of his blog.​[9]​ A major turning point was achieved in 2012 with the election of four 5SM mayors (including a notable victory in Parma). The crowning glory came in the February 2013 national elections where the party rose from under 5% in the opinion polls (in 2011) to capture over 25% of the vote and 109 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. 

The German Pirate Party has been more limited in its electoral achievements. It began life in 2006 as an extension of the international Pirate Party movement with the original goal of shaping the ‘digital revolution’ through the fight against regulation of the Internet and the championing of direct democracy (Niedermayer 2013). For the Piratenpartei the Internet and the new social media are both a key political issue and an important organisational tool. In October 2013, the Piratenpartei had over 120,000 Twitter followers and almost 90,000 Facebook likes in Berlin alone. In contrast to the centralisation of policy-making around Grillo in the 5SM, the Piratenpartei has advocated the ‘co-production’ (‘Mitmachung’) of party policy (around 20% of its approximately 30,000 members are regularly engaged in policy-making) (Neumann and Fritz 2012). Through the system of ‘liquid democracy’ party members have the right to help draft policies (in forums and wikis), which are then diffused and debated through the social media. 

After 2011, the party was able to score some notable electoral successes. The Piratenpartei’s central message, its criticism of government surveillance through internet snooping, has particular resonance in Germany as a result of its nationalist socialist past and the prevalence of state surveillance in East Germany through the Stasi. This came to a head after 2009, when the federal government tried push through legislation allowing greater supervision of the Internet, to (allegedly) deal with the problem of child pornography.​[10]​ The Pirate Party’s argument was that the issue of child pornography was being ‘instrumentalised’ by the Government to allow the regulation of a free internet (Niedermayer 2013: 35-36). In this instance, the Piratenpartei could ‘claim’ to be the only political party on the side of citizens’ rights. The party was also able to tap into support for global protest movement in 2011, capitalising on sentiment against the authority of political and economic elites. At this point in time, the Piratenpartei was able to successfully profile itself against the existing political order, offering a new way of doing politics, and move beyond it niche support. 

From 2011 onwards, the Piratenpartei gained significant ground, moving well beyond its 2% showing in the 2009 federal elections, to pass the 5% threshold needed to enter the regional assemblies of four German states (Berlin in 2011, and Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein and North-Rhine Westphalia in 2012. The great success in the Berlin city elections, where the Piratenpartei took just under 9% of the vote, was telling. Berliners were particularly disillusioned with city politics due to rapidly rising rents, overstretched public services, and the spiralling costs of building a new city airport. Berlin also had the right demographic – a relatively large proportion of young, highly-educated and social progressive citizens (Niedermayer 2013). And these demographic advantages helped the party to establish a major grass-roots presence (the Pirates were made themselves visible on the streets through a poster campaign, rallies, and various publicity stunts) that the Pirate’s have been unable to achieve on a national scale. These regional successes helped create a groundswell of support for the Piratenpartei, which was regularly (nationally) polling over 10% in 2012. 

However, with increased visibility came increased scrutiny. The Piratenpartei was heavily criticised, by mainstream politicians and the traditional media for its lack of leadership. This, on its own, was not decisive. But, after its success in regional elections, the party became beset with internal disputes, often over inward-looking matters such as the operation of its liquid democracy policy-making procedures. Furthermore, the Pirate’s representatives in the regional assemblies came across as naive and lacking direction, and any attempt to assert leadership was met with a backlash by the party faithful. For example, the decision by the party group in the Berlin Senate to hold policy meetings behind closed doors was widely derided for its lack of transparency and exclusivity. Efforts by party chairman, Bernd Schlömer, to develop a broader programme and ‘set out the Pirate’s policy positions more clearly’ were also met with fierce resistance by ‘fundamentalists’, who wanted to maintain a strict focus on the issue of internet freedom (Der Spiegel 2013). The political in-fighting, the lack of coherent leadership at the national level, and the amateurish   behaviour in regional assemblies contributed to a dramatic fall in the opinion polls and the failure of the party in the September 2013 federal election, in which they scored only 2% (well below the 5% threshold needed for representation in the Bundestag). When the story of US surveillance of German nationals through the so-called PRISM system broke in May 2013, the Piratenpartei was not even able to take advantage of an open goal in the run-up to the national election.​[11]​
 
As much as these two quite different political parties were marked by their use of online and offline media systems and spaces – more successfully in the case of the Five Star Movement – to sustain their political support, the 5SM and Piratenpartei were also defined by their organisational structures. In particular, the abundance (in the case of Grillo and the 5SM) or lack (in the case of the German Pirate Party) of hierarchical power structures. Grillo himself held the rights to the name and symbol of the Five-Star Movement (Bartlett et al. 2013). And, through his populist appeal, characterised by his blogs and public appearances, he maintains a strong control over the party. Bordignon and Cessarini (2013: 2) explain that Grillo ‘is the mouthpiece of the party from the bottom up, but, at the same time he exercises a total control of the movement’s strategic choices.’​[12]​ At the level of the Meetup networks, this was not problematic, as the activities of 5SM activists in their communities did not contradict Grillo’s positions on national issues. However, after the 5SM’s electoral success in the national elections of 2013, the contradiction between these hierarchical power structures and the populist appeal of Grillo, and the work of 5SM elected representatives became more apparent. After the national elections of 2013, several 5SM representatives, including Senator Adele Gambaro, complained about Grillo’s continued assaults on Parliament and his failure to engage in the political process in a constructive way after the movement’s electoral success. Gambaro and others were subsequently invited to leave the party if they did not like the way it was run. 

For the Piratenpartei, the lack of a centralised leadership inhibited the work of its representatives in regional assemblies, but also led to political in-fighting and the inability of the party to capitalise on a favourable political climate (i.e. the Snowden/ PRISM Affair) in the run-up to the 2013 federal elections. In comparison to the 5SM, the Piratenpartei lacked the leadership, the street presence and a deep sense of political and economic crisis. The diversity of the 5SM hybrid model, with its strong combination of offline and online engagement, has also helped to sustain the movement despite the problems associated with political success. However, this article argues that the rise and fall of Piratenpartei (and to a lesser extent the dilemmas facing the 5SM after its electoral success) both illustrate the limits of connective action for political parties. For political parties, operating within existing political structures, hierarchies of power continue to be necessary for electoral success: they provide leadership autonomy, allowing parties to appeal beyond niche audiences. 


New Youth Protest: born of crises or the new normal? 

This article has examined the organisation, communication and mobilisation of youth-oriented movements and parties in the digital age. The case studies shed light on where new forms of participation are successful and what the limits of this success might be within different socio-economic contexts and operating within different civic-political cultures.

It is clear that Bennett and Segerberg’s (2013) logic of connective action has a profound relevance for the loosely institutionalised protest movements that developed in Spain and Portugal. The 15 May and 12 March movements deliberately distanced themselves from established political organisations, and organised themselves in a networked fashion through the integration of offline and online tools. In these instances, the use of the new media led to a quickening of political participation, as the movements were able to share information, recruit and mobilise online (in real-time) alongside engagement in offline activities that were of great symbolic value. 

Although connective action also has relevance for the emergent political parties, the Five-Star Movement and the Piratenpartei, the interface between loose, horizontal organisational structures and the realities of party politics are clearly problematic. The 5SM demonstrates that, within the framework of a charismatic and populist leadership, connective action and digitally networked action is quite possible.​[13]​ Nevertheless, the danger is that, by trying to be everything, you become nothing. This is the lesson shown by the rise and fall of the German Pirate Party. However, the Piratenpartei was not boosted to nearly the same extent as the M12M, M15M and 5SM, by an urgent sense of political and economic crisis. The re-election of Chancellor Merkel in 2013 – with an eight percentage point gain from 2009 – was indicative of general satisfaction with how the country was being run. 

What these four cases studies also show is the importance of hybridity – of media systems and public spaces (Castells 2012; Chadwick 2013). The most successful of the case studies, the Spanish indignados and the Italian Five-Star Movement, have used different media platforms and online and offline spaces to reinforce one another and sustain the momentum of the movements. The new media also provided a central tool to directly appeal to citizens (particularly the young and highly-educated) without having to play by the rules of the old media or channel their energies through establishes political institutions. 

The social movements and political parties examined in this article all had a particular appeal to young and highly-educated citizens. In Spain, Portugal and Italy, the M15M, the M12M and the 5SM all managed to tap into a broader sense of crisis felt by large sections of society.  These crises have proved so effective in mobilising young people, because they operate both on a personal (micro-) and societal (macro-) level, connecting young people’s individual experiences of youth unemployment, high university tuition fees etc. to broader economic and political issues such as economic inequality. In Germany, that broader sense of crisis simply did not exist, and so the Pirate Party found it hard to move beyond its rather niche political constituency. In Spain, Portugal and Italy, the concerns of citizens and the (negative) impact of political and economic elites on young people’s everyday lives was tangible. 

However, if these movements are dependent upon crises, how sustainable are they likely to be over the longer term? The first point to make is that, if they are supported by a vibrant civic-political culture (as in the Spanish case), their impact can be more enduring. The second point to make is that the influence of these kinds of movements is always likely to be diffuse, as their ideas permeate through the political system – and maybe become adopted or adapted by the political establishment – over time. 
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^1	  The emergence of self-reflexive forms of participation was evident long before the recent financial crisis began in 2007 and 2008 (Giddens 1991). Norris (2002), for example, charts the decline in participation in electoral politics alongside the rebirth political engagement in issue-based forms of activism (e.g. the environmental movement) since the 1970s.
^2	  In Portugal, the dire economic situation led to the acceptance of an EU/ IMF financial bailout (of Euros 78bn) in May 2011 under the condition of further austerity. Spain did not accept a financial bailout – under similar terms – until 2012 (a Euros 100bn bailout for Spanish banks), but large public spending cuts had already been put in place by 2011.
^3	  Another recent example of youth protest in Spain was the exposure of the Aznar Government’s manipulation of the facts (by thousands of young Spaniards on their mobile phones) regarding the Madrid train bombings of 11 March 2004 for political purposes. This directly contributed to the fall of the Conservative Government in national elections a few days later.
^4	  There was a conspicuous lack of mass demonstrations in Portugal between the Carnation Revolution in 1974 and the protests that followed the global financial crisis.
^5	  The 15 May demonstrations were preceded by several smaller including a demonstration in Madrid on 7 April by the student group Youth Without a Future (‘Juventud Sin Futuro’).
^6	  For example, one of the Monti Government’s first measures was to freeze recruitment in the public sector.
^7	  Through it social policies – in particular the state-subsides for employment during this period – the German Government, thus, managed to forestall significant increases in unemployment.
^8	  The network also extended to a number of cities outside Italy with large Italian communities, including a large Meetup group in Washington DC.
^9	  One such public event was Grillo’s swim from Calabria to Sicily in the run-up to the Sicilian election in 2012. These elections proved to be an important success, as the 5SM candidate for the regional presidency achieved and an impressive 15% of the vote.
^10	  The German Pirate Party again seemed to be on the right side of the public debate regarding the publishing of leaked US intelligence documents through Wikileaks (from April 2011), unequivocally supporting the position of the organisation and its founder, Julian Assange. 
^11	  German public opinion was generally supportive of Edward Snowden, so the Piratenpartei’s position – unlike the two main parties – had clear public backing.
^12	  Grillo was not afraid to exert his authority over party representatives. For example, Bologna city councillor, Frederica Salsi, was publicly condemned by Grillo (on his blog) for holding a TV interview. This went against Grillo’s own position on non-engagement with the established media (although the rules for 5SM representatives had been far from clear) (Bartlett et al. 2013).
^13	  Indeed, Grillo supporters have a particular distrust for traditional political and social institutions, including politicians, political parties and big business, but also the Church and trade unions (Bartlett et al. 2013: 40), 
